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1

Introduction

Economic theory and intuition suggest that an effective way to obtain reliable information
is to consult several well-informed experts with conflicting interests. Competition between
experts may spur information transmission and allows for comparing their recommendations.
However, competitive pressures may drive experts to dissipate a considerable amount of
resources to influence decision-makers. The trade-off between decision-makers’ accuracy
and the wasteful use of resources for persuasion is central in, e.g., lobbying, legal systems
(Posner, 1999; Tullock, 1975), and the efficient design of organizations (Milgrom, 1988).
This paper uses a controlled experiment to study how competition between experts affects
this trade-off.
We present a novel experimental design that builds upon canonical sender-receiver
environments. There are three players: two senders with conflicting interests and one
decision-maker. The two senders observe the realization of a random variable, which we
will call from now on the drawn value. The drawn value can be either a positive or a
negative integer. Depending on the treatment, one or both senders privately deliver a
report to the decision-maker. The decision-maker is fully aware of the senders’ preferences
and cares about learning the sign of the drawn value.1
A key feature of our setup is that senders can misreport the drawn value at a cost
proportional to the size of the lie: reports claiming that the drawn value is further away
from its actual realization are more expensive.2 The explicit inclusion of misreporting costs
makes our environment one of “costly talk” rather than cheap talk. This feature allows us
to measure the resources senders use to influence decision-makers, a critical component
of players’ welfare currently unexplored in related experimental work. The presence of
multiple senders and misreporting costs generates a framework that combines an all-pay
contest with a communication game. This combination produces an interesting trade-off
because competition is typically beneficial in the former and detrimental in the latter.3
In this experiment, we perform a treatment manipulation by varying the number of
1

The drawn value can therefore be naturally interpreted as a quality dimension, valence score, or
vertical differentiation parameter. For example, in a courtroom the state can represent the quality of a
test, strength of evidence, or competence of a witness expert. To adjudicate, the judge needs to believe
that the supporting evidence is strong enough, “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
2
These “misreporting costs” have a broad interpretation. They can encapsulate direct costs for
tampering with evidence, the time and effort required to credibly “cook the numbers,” bribe witnesses,
manipulate earnings, etc. Alternatively, they can incorporate more indirect and non-pecuniary costs
such as reputation damages, perjury convictions, or moral concerns. Our underlying assumption is that
misreporting more is—in expectation—more costly, as doing so requires the use of more resources or it
increases the probability of being caught in a lie (see e.g., Abeler, Nosenzo, & Raymond, 2019; Gneezy,
Kajackaite, & Sobel, 2018; Kartik, Ottaviani, & Squintani, 2007)
3
More specifically, our setup can be thought as an all-pay contest where the success function is
endogenous. In communication games, competition between senders makes decision-makers better
informed (Battaglini, 2002; Krishna & Morgan, 2001b). By contrast, competition is thought to be
detrimental to contestants (Baye, Kovenock, & De Vries, 1999; Tullock, 1975).
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senders allowed to make a report. In our baseline condition, we consider a monopolistic news
market where only one of the two senders communicates with the decision-maker. Instead,
the treatment variation mimics a competitive news market where both senders privately
communicate with the decision-maker. Because senders are equally and perfectly informed,
they compete in the provision of the same piece of information. The absence of information
aggregation problems allows us to isolate the effects of competition on the players’ welfare.
We say that a sender allowed to communicate is active. In contrast, a spectating sender
is inactive. The only difference between the two experimental conditions is the number
of active senders. This number determines the underlying strategic environment: the
competitive treatment has an adversarial component absent in the monopolistic baseline.
The decision-maker can compare and cross-validate the reports of two active senders,
whereas she cannot make such comparisons when one sender spectates.
The main findings can be summarized as follows. The introduction of competition
between senders significantly decreases the total welfare. The sum of individual payoffs
is lower in competition than in the baseline condition. There are two determinants to
this result. First, on average, competition does not make decision-makers better informed.
Second, the total amount of resources devoted to misreporting information is about two
times higher in the competitive condition than in the monopolistic one. The average cost
incurred per active sender is similar across treatments. However, the rate at which each
active sender achieves persuasion is substantially lower in the competitive treatment. As a
result, senders are worse off under competition, and the duplication of their misreporting
costs drives the total welfare down.
Even though both treatments’ most informative equilibrium is fully revealing, we find
that some information is consistently lost. There is evidence of an under-communication
effect: decision-makers make less informed choices than predicted in the most informative
equilibrium. In the monopolistic treatment, decision-makers obtain a payoff that is not
significantly different from what is predicted in the least informative equilibrium. These
results contrast with the over-communication phenomenon observed in related cheap
talk experiments. As argued in Minozzi and Woon (2019), over-communication in the
monopolistic treatment may explain why competition has a negligible effect on the amount
of information transmitted. However, this cannot be the case in our costly talk setup.
Our results contribute to the debate concerning the effects of competition in communication environments. Conventional wisdom asserts that competition in news markets
promotes truth and informs decision-makers better (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2008). Informational theories support this view (Battaglini, 2002; Krishna & Morgan, 2001b). In
contrast, Tullock’s criticism of the common law (Tullock, 1975) suggests that adversary
dispute resolution systems are informationally inefficient and socially wasteful. A central
point of this criticism is that contending parties in adversary systems dissipate a sub-
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stantial amount of resources to influence decision-makers.4 As a result, “decentralized
self-interested behavior by litigants depresses overall social welfare” (Zywicki, 2008).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature.
Section 3 introduces the experimental design, and Section 4 discusses the theoretical
background. Results are in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. Other material is in
the Online Appendix.

2

Related Literature

This paper contributes to the experimental literature on strategic communication. Most
work in this literature builds on the theoretical framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982) by
studying settings with one sender and payoff-irrelevant messages.5 A recurrent finding is the
over-communication effect, that is, more information is revealed in controlled experiments
than in the most informative equilibria (Blume, DeJong, Kim, & Sprinkle, 1998, 2001;
Cai & Wang, 2006; Dickhaut, McCabe, & Mukherji, 1995; Kawagoe & Takizawa, 2009;
Sánchez-Pagés & Vorsatz, 2007; Wang, Spezio, & Camerer, 2010). In our setup with a
single sender but payoff-relevant messages, we find evidence of an under-communication
effect: less information is revealed than in the most informative equilibrium.
Differently from the above line of work, we consider an experimental condition with
two competing senders. Theoretical work on strategic communication with multiple
senders suggests that more information can be revealed with two senders than with one
(Battaglini, 2002; Gilligan & Krehbiel, 1989; Krishna & Morgan, 2001a, 2001b; Milgrom &
Roberts, 1986). However, the empirical evidence is mixed. Lai, Lim, and Wang (2015)
use a multidimensional state space to study fully revealing equilibria as in Battaglini
(2002) and find that more information is transmitted with two senders than with one.6 In
experiments with a one-dimensional state space, Battaglini, Lai, Lim, and Wang (2019) and
Minozzi and Woon (2019) find that decision-makers do not make more informed decisions
when consulting an additional expert. In Battaglini et al. (2019) senders communicate
simultaneously, while in Minozzi and Woon (2019) senders communicate sequentially. Both
studies find over-communication with one sender but do not find full information revelation
when the number of senders is two. In contrast, Minozzi and Woon (2016) show that
when two senders communicate simultaneously and are privately informed about their
own preferences, there is over-communication and the resulting outcome is close to be
fully revealing. Bayindir, Gurdal, Ozdogan, and Saglam (2020) find that with two senders
there is no statistically significant over-communication effect, independently of whether
the timing of communication is simultaneous or sequential.
4

See, e.g., Zywicki (2008) and references therein.
For a survey of the experimental literature on cheap talk, see Blume, Lai, and Lim (2020).
6
Vespa and Wilson (2016) show that fully revealing equilibria can be approximated in the laboratory
by using a particular setting with a multidimensional state space.
5
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Our experiment differs from all the papers mentioned above as we introduce misreporting costs that are proportional to the size of the lie.7 Messages impact directly on the
senders’ payoffs, and therefore “talk is not cheap.” Instead, communication takes the form
of costly signaling.8 For this reason, our setting is more closely related to the theoretical
work on communication with exogenous lying costs (Kartik, 2009; Kartik et al., 2007;
Vaccari, 2021a, 2021b) than to that of cheap talk and verifiable disclosure.
A few experiments include communication costs in settings with multiple senders. As
we consider senders that compete to persuade a decision-maker, our setting is related to
experiments that study information in adversarial procedures. Block, Parker, Vyborna, and
Dusek (2000) and Block and Parker (2004) compare the adversarial and the inquisitorial
judicial systems in an experiment where auditors enforce an anti-perjury rule.9 Boudreau
and McCubbins (2008, 2009) analyze competition between senders that incur penalties for
lying.10 Differently from this body of work, our experiment focuses on the comparison
between monopoly and competition in information provision, and studies the welfare of all
market participants.
Agranov, Dasgupta, and Schotter (2020) analyze the impact of competition on the
welfare of all players in a setting where senders suffer from induced lying costs.11 Senders are
sellers that are privately informed about the quality of their product and their preferences,
lying cost included. In their experiment, the welfare of all players is lower with competition
than without it. This result is due to a twofold empirical effect of competition on players’
behavior: it drives senders to lie more frequently and makes receivers more credulous.
In Agranov et al. (2020) sellers use messages to compete in a product market, but they
do not compete in the provision of information. By contrast, our experiment considers
senders that are equally informed and whose preferences are common knowledge. In
our environment, senders compete for the decision-maker’s beliefs over the same state of
nature.
7

A prominent explanation for the over-communication effect is the presence of pro-social preferences,
and in particular of subjects’ lying aversion (Hurkens & Kartik, 2009; Sánchez-Pagés & Vorsatz, 2007,
2009). In a setting with two senders, preference uncertainty, and a one-dimensional state space, Minozzi
and Woon (2013) use priming and labeling to affect subjects’ lying aversion indirectly.
8
Experiments on signalling games (see, e.g., Kübler, Müller, and Normann (2008) and references
therein) study settings with a different signalling structure than our paper, have a different scope, and
feature a single sender only. An exception to the latter is Müller, Spiegel, and Yehezkel (2009), which
studies oligopoly limit pricing with two informed senders.
9
They define perjury as “embellishment as well as falsification” of information, which is punishable by
the forfeiture of the offending party’s full potential payoff. Differently than in our setting, in Block et al.
(2000) and in Block and Parker (2004) the two contending parties are not equally and fully informed.
10
The penalty consists in the deduction of a fixed sum of money from a sender’s earnings for each time
such a sender makes a false statement. In Boudreau and McCubbins (2008, 2009) the receivers have
unobserved, uncontrolled, and potentially heterogeneous beliefs about the realized state.
11
Agranov et al. (2020) also induce other belief-dependent psychological costs such as guilt and
disappointment. Conversely, our misreporting costs are common knowledge, belief-independent, and map
from larger state and message spaces, thus allowing senders to deliver lies of different magnitudes.
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3

Experimental Design

Game. In all sessions of our experiment, groups of three participants make decisions
for 30 rounds of play. At the beginning of each session, subjects are randomly assigned
to a fixed role: either Senderi , with i ∈ {1, 2}, or Decision Maker (from now on DM).12
At the start of each round, and for each group, an integer number labeled as drawn
value is randomly drawn from the interval [-100, +100] using a truncated discrete normal
distribution with µ = 0 and σ = 25.13 This number determines the state of the world: if
negative, the state of the world is said to be RED, BLACK otherwise. The state can be
either RED or BLACK with equal probability if the number is zero. The drawn value
is revealed to Sender1 and Sender2 only. Upon receiving this information, both senders
must report an integer from the interval [-100, +100] to DM. Having observed the two
reports, DM has to guess the state of the world by choosing either action Red or action
Black. While the decision-maker is always better off if the guess is correct, Sender1 and
Sender2 have misaligned incentives. Sender1 always prefers action Black while Sender2
always prefers action Red. Therefore, Sender1 (Sender2 ) might gain by overreporting
(under-) the random number and persuade DM to choose action Black (Red). However,
misreporting is only possible by bearing a cost ci . Both senders incur a cost that depends
on the difference between the random number and their report. Hence, the larger the
lie, the larger the cost.14 The expected payoffs and the cost are automatically displayed
and updated on participants’ screens to avoid cognitive strain and allow subjects to focus
on the experimental game. Once the decision-maker selects an action, the payoffs of all
group members are assigned accordingly. To promote learning, at the end of each round
participants are provided with a summary of the current and the previous rounds of their
group. Hence, they acquire information about the drawn value, the state, the two reports,
the DM’s action, and all individual payoffs. Table 1 summarises the experimental payoffs.
Treatments. In our experiment, we exogenously vary the market configuration.
Our baseline treatment MONO is the game described above, with the only exception
being that we allow Sender1 to act as a monopolist in the market. Hence, we bar Sender2
from reporting information to DM. For this reason, in this treatment Sender2 bears no
misreporting costs. As Sender2 acts as a spectator, we elicit their beliefs about the choices
of the other group members. First, we elicit the belief that Sender1 reports the drawn
value truthfully. Second, we ask for the probability of DM choosing Black conditional on
12

In the experiment we used neutral labels so as to not frame participants.
We carefully chose this distribution in order to increase the number of rounds where misreporting is
more likely, i.e., around zero. Using an uniform distribution would instead lead to more extreme random
numbers, where persuasion is too expensive. Although a uniform distribution is easier to understand, we
wrote our instructions carefully, making sure that the salient characteristics of the normal distribution
were clear enough (see Appendix A). A similar approach has been used in Enke and Zimmermann (2019).
- Reporti |
14
In the experiment we used the following cost function: ci = 25×|Drawn Number
. We calibrated
3
the cost function to allow for the presence of fully revealing equilibria in both our treatments. Thus,
failures of perfect information transmission cannot be attributed to an absence of fully revealing equilibria.
13
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Payoff

Choice

Sender1

1200 − c1
400 − c1

Black
Red

Sender2

400 − c2
1200 − c2

Black
Red

DM

600
200

if = state
otherwise

Table 1 Experimental payoffs.

Sender1 ’s report. These beliefs were elicited through an incentive-compatible mechanism.
To keep incentives constant across treatments, we do not inform the other two players
that Sender2 can earn extra money from these two questions.15 This treatment is essential
to isolate the effect of competition, and shuts down any difference in behavior between
treatments that might be due to other-regarding preferences. In treatment COMP, instead,
we allow for competition between the two senders as described previously: both senders
privately report a number to the decision-maker. In all treatments, the payoffs of the three
group members depend on the action chosen by DM. Hence, we can compare their welfare
among the different market configurations.
Additional variables. At the end of each session, we elicit a self-reported questionnaire. The answers allow us to check whether treatments were balanced with respect to
individual characteristics and to control for personal traits in regression analysis. First, we
elicit the gender and the age of the respondent. We then obtain a few individual attitudes
toward risk, trust, and honesty. These three questions were answered using a Likert scale.
The propensity to take risks was captured by the answer to the question “Do you see
yourself as a person ready to take risk or you try to avoid it? ”. We allow for 11 possible
levels going from “0: absolutely unwilling to take risks” to “10: absolutely willing to take
risks”. Trust was elicited by the following question: “In general, do you think people can be
trusted? ”. Answers could span from “0: No, you must always be cautious” to “2: Yes, you
can almost always trust”. Finally, answers to “In general, do you think people try to take
advantage of others if they get the chance?” ranged from “0: No, people always behave
correctly” to “3: Yes, they always try to take advantage of it”. We use this question as a
proxy for honesty of others. See Appendix A for more details.
Procedures. The experiments took place between March 2021 and October 2021.
The experiment was programmed and conducted using the oTree open-source platform
(Chen, Schonger, & Wickens, 2016) and supervised online: participants’ identities and
15
As the possibility of receiving money from the two beliefs is Sender2 ’s private information, this extra
payment is not included in the analysis where we compare welfare across treatments.
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compliance with the rules were verified through a Zoom meeting. In total, 192 students
recruited from the subject pool of the Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory
(CEEL) at the University of Trento participated in our experiment. We implemented
a between-subject design, where students were allocated to one session as well as one
treatment only. Table B.1 in Appendix B provides basic randomization checks, showing
treatments were balanced with respect to most of the key variables. Instructions were
presented on computer screens and read out loud. Subjects then answered control questions
and participated in a trial round to familiarize themselves with the task and the graphic
interface. Groups were randomly and anonymously formed at the beginning of each round.
Hence, we shut down the channel of reputation. Final payments in the experiment were
based on the average earnings of two randomly selected rounds. In the event a participant
made a loss (resulting from paying a very high cost of misreporting in the rounds selected
for payments), the participation fee covered this loss. In case the fee was insufficient, we
asked subjects to complete an additional task whose duration was proportional to their
loss.16 Eventually, no subject had to complete the additional task. Payoffs in each round
were given in points and converted into cash at the end of the session using the following
conversion rate: 100 points for 1 Euro. A typical session lasted about 80 minutes, and the
average payment was 11.93 Euros, including a 4 Euros participation fee. The experiment
was preregistered at OSF Registries (https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/DXWT7). Data
and replication files can be found at: https://osf.io/9svpf.

4

Theoretical Background

This section studies the equilibria of the continuous approximation of our experimental
conditions. The analysis performed here informs us of the expected payoffs the decisionmaker can attain in equilibrium. In Section 5.4, we compare our theoretical predictions
with the empirical payoffs. This comparison allows us to test for an over-communication
effect present in related work and potentially important in interpreting our results. The
equilibrium analysis performed in this section draws from results obtained in Vaccari
(2021a, 2021b). We conclude by studying the decision-maker’s payoff in several benchmark
cases.
There are two equally informed senders (Sender1 and Sender2 ), and an uninformed
decision-maker (DM). There is a random variable with realization θ ∈ Θ = [−ϕ, ϕ], with
ϕ > 0. We refer to θ as the drawn value. This score is distributed according to the pdf f ,
which has full support in Θ and is symmetric around zero. Senders perfectly observe θ.
Depending on the treatment, either one or both senders deliver a report rj ∈ Θ, j ∈ {1, 2}.
16

Subjects had to count the number of zeroes in a series of 7x10 matrices, whose number was proportional
to the participant’s loss. We chose this task for two reasons: (i) it does not distort incentives of misreporting,
(ii) and allows us to provide a low participation fee preventing the risk of decreasing the salience of the
main experimental task.
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In COMP, both senders deliver a report privately or simultaneously; in MONO, only
sender 1 delivers a report, whereas sender 2 cannot. After observing senders’ reports, both
not the drawn value, the decision-maker takes an action a ∈ {Red, Black}.
Player i ∈ {1, 2, DM } gets utility ui (θ, a) when the decision-maker selects action a
and the state is θ. In addition, Senderj gets a total payoff of wj (rj , θ, a) = uj (θ, a)−C(rj , θ)
from delivering report rj when the drawn value is θ and the decision-maker selects action
a. C(·) is a misreporting cost function.17 Apart from senders having private information
about the drawn value, every other aspect of the model is common knowledge. The
solution concept we use is perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE).
Parameters. The space Θ has ϕ = 100, and therefore Θ = [−100, 100]. The
continuous probability distribution f has full support in Θ and is symmetric around zero.18
The decision-maker’s payoff is uR (Black, θ) = 600 when θ > 0 and uR (Black, θ) = 200
when θ < 0; it is uR (Red, θ) = 600 when θ < 0 and uR (Red, θ) = 200 when θ > 0. When
θ = 0, the decision-maker is equally likely to obtain a payoff of 600 and 200 independently of
her chosen action. Senders’ payoffs are, for every θ ∈ Θ, u1 (Black, θ) = u2 (Red, θ) = 1200
|r − θ|.
and u1 (Red, θ) = u2 (Black, θ) = 400. Finally, misreporting costs are C(r, θ) = 25
3
Reach. We define Sender1 ’s reach when the drawn value is θ as the report r̄1 (θ) > θ
such that u1 (Red, θ) = u1 (Black, θ)−C(r̄1 (θ), θ). We obtain that r̄1 (θ) = θ +96. Similarly,
we define Sender2 ’s reach when the drawn value is θ as the report r̄2 (θ) < θ such that
u2 (Black, θ) = u2 (Red, θ) − C(r̄2 (θ), θ). We obtain that r̄2 (θ) = θ − 96.

4.1

Monopolistic Equilibria

We begin our analysis by studying the perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of the monopolistic
condition MONO. We focus on those PBE that survive the Intuitive Criterion (Cho &
Kreps, 1987). Define,
λ̄ = Ef [θ|θ ∈ (0, r̄1 (0))],
r̂(λ) = {r ∈ Θ|Ef [θ|θ ∈ (r̄1−1 (r), r)] = λ},
where r̄1−1 (r) = r − 96 is the inverse function of Sender1 ’s reach. Equilibria of the
monopolistic condition have the following structure: given a λ ∈ [0, λ̄], the monopolistic
Sender1 ’s reporting rule ρ1 (θ, λ) is,
(

r̂(λ)
if θ ∈ r̄1−1 (r̂(λ)) , r̂(λ)
ρ1 (θ, λ) =
(1)
θ
otherwise.
17

We will focus on the cases where, as in the experimental conditions, players have step utility functions
and misreporting costs are linear. However, the equilibria’s structure remains similar under general
preferences, such as non-linear misreporting costs and utilities.
18
The monopolistic and competitive equilibria discussed in this section are not affected by the distribution,
provided f is an atomless pdf with full support in Θ and symmetric around zero. The actual experimental
distribution is a truncated Normal distribution with support in [-100,100], zero mean, and a standard
deviation of 25.
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The decision-maker sequentially rationally selects action Black when r1 ≥ r̂(λ), and selects
Red otherwise.
Persuasion takes place when θ ∈ (r̄1−1 (r̂(λ)), 0). We obtain an equilibrium that
fully reveals the sign of the drawn value by setting λ = λ̄. In this case, we have that
r̂(λ̄) = r̄1 (0) = 96 and r̄1−1 (r̂(λ̄)) = 0. By contrast, the least informative equilibrium has
λ = 0. In this case, we have that r̂(0) = 48, misreporting occurs when θ ∈ (−48, 48), and
persuasion takes place when θ ∈ (−48, 0).
Denote with F the CDF of f . In a fully revealing equilibrium, the decision-maker
always selects the optimal action and thus gets a payoff of 600. By contrast, in the least
informative equilibrium the decision-maker obtains an expected payoff of
F (−48 < θ < 0) · 400 + (1 − F (−48 < θ < 0)) · 600 ≈ 505.48.

4.2

Competitive Equilibria

We now turn our attention to perfect Bayesian equilibria of our competitive condition
COMP.19 There are equilibria that fully reveal the drawn value. These equilibria are
similar to the revealing equilibrium of the monopolistic condition. The following is an
example: Sender1 ’s reporting rule is the same as in the fully revealing equilibrium of the
monopolistic condition (see ρ1 (θ, λ) in (1) with λ = λ̄), whereas Sender2 always reports
truthfully the state. The decision-maker selects action Black if and only if the report
delivered by Sender1 is equal to or higher than r̄1 (0), and selects action Red otherwise.
In this fully revealing equilibrium, the decision-maker always learns the drawn value and
obtains an expected payoff of 600.
Equilibria of this condition are formally studied in Vaccari (2021a). There, it is shown
that there are also other equilibria that satisfy natural conditions and have appealing
properties, including uniqueness and robustness to refinement criteria. In these adversarial
equilibria, the decision-maker does not always learn the sign of the drawn value, and
thus obtains a payoff that is lower than 600. Senders always report truthfully when
θ∈
/ [−48, 48], and play mixed strategies otherwise. The set [−48, 48] is obtained by finding
the drawn values that satisfy r̄j (θ) = −θ for j ∈ {1, 2}. Consider a θ ∈ (−48, 48), and
recall that r̄1 (θ) = θ + 96 and r̄2 (θ) = θ − 96. The support of Sender1 ’s reporting strategy
is S1 (θ) = [θ, −r̄2 (θ)] when θ ∈ [0, 48), and it is S1 (θ) = {θ} ∪ [−θ, r̄1 (θ)] when θ ∈ (−48, 0].
The support of Sender2 ’s reporting strategy is S2 (θ) = [r̄2 (θ), −θ] ∪ {θ} when θ ∈ [0, 48),
and it is S2 (θ) = [−r̄1 (θ), θ] when θ ∈ (−48, 0]. Sender 1 reports truthfully with probability
α1 (θ) = 2θ · 25/3
when θ ∈ [0, 48), and with probability α1 (θ) = 25/3
· (96 − 2θ) − 1 when
800
800
· (96 − 2θ) when
θ ∈ (−48, 0]. Sender2 reports truthfully with probability α2 (θ) = 1 − 25/3
800
25/3
θ ∈ [0, 48), and with probability α2 (θ) = −2θ · 800 when θ ∈ (−48, 0]. When misreporting,
19

The Intuitive Criterion does not readily apply to games with more than one informed sender, and
therefore we do not use it in our solution concept for this case.
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Senderj delivers a report rj ∈ Sj (θ) \ {θ} with a state- and report-independent probability
density ψj (rj , θ) = 25/3
.
800
We define a lower bound for the decision-maker’s payoff. Suppose that, given the
senders’ strategies in an adversarial equilibrium, the decision-maker selects Black if and
only if r1 ≥ 0, and selects Red otherwise. Their expected payoff from following this
non-sequentially rational rule is
Z 0
Z 0
W = 600(.5 + F (−48)) + 600
f (θ)α1 (θ)dθ + 400
f (θ)(1 − α1 (θ))dθ ≈ 518.10.
−48

4.3

−48

Benchmarks

Finally, we analyze a series of benchmark cases. Consider a cheap talk variant of the
model discussed above, where C(·) = 0 always. Given that we study a situation of pure
conflict between players, only babbling equilibria can exist. Therefore, in both treatments,
the decision-maker obtains an expected payoff of 400, whereas senders get an expected
payoff of 800. Players would obtain the same expected payoffs if they were not allowed to
communicate. Consider now a model variant where the decision-maker is fully informed
about the drawn value. In this case, the decision-maker obtains an expected payoff of 600,
whereas senders get an expected payoff of 800. Players would obtain the same expected
payoffs if senders were not allowed to misreport information.

5

Results

We start this section by first describing the choices of senders (Sender1 and Sender2 ) and
decision-makers (DM). Then, we focus our analysis on welfare measured via individual
payoffs (Net Payoffs). Finally, we present some additional results that help understand
behavior in the experiment.

5.1

Senders

Figure 1 provides a representation of senders’ behavior in terms of reported values conditional on drawn values. The leftward panel portrays behavior in MONO and the rightward
panel in COMP. The size of the circles captures the joint frequency of the reports given
the observed drawn value. The continuous line represents a polynomial fitting of the data.
The gradient of bars on the side of the graph depicts the marginal distribution of drawn
(x-axis) and reported values (y-axis).
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(a) MONO

(b) COMP

Figure 1 Drawn and reported values by treatment.
Panel (a) shows reports of Sender1 conditional on the drawn value in MONO. Panel (b) shows
reports from both senders in COMP. Each circle captures the joint frequency of the reports given
the realized drawn value. The red line represents a polynomial fitting of the data. The x-axis
depicts the marginal distribution of the realized random draws. The y-axis shows the marginal
distribution of reported values.

Deviations from truthful reporting are widespread: only 49.2% and 56.5% of reports
are truthful in COMP and MONO, respectively. The figure shows that senders react to
the monetary incentives in both experimental conditions and tend to misreport to their
advantage. Sender1 overreports the drawn value while Sender2 tends to send negative
reports more frequently (see the marginal distribution of reports on the y-axis). The bubble
plot suggests that deviations are more frequent for values closer to zero, as confirmed by
the fitting curve. When computing deviations of reported values from drawn values,20 the
overall average deviation is 9.634 in the monopoly and 9.614 in the competition treatment.
As the figure suggests, senders misreport to a larger extent when they have a conflict of
20

The deviation is computed as the difference between the report and the drawn value for Sender1 and
the opposite (drawn value - report) for Sender2 .
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interest with DM. In these cases, the average deviation is 13.291 and 13.386 in MONO
and COMP, respectively. Table 2 provides a summary description of misreporting costs
sustained by senders in the two treatments.
Treatment Role N

Mean

SD

Median

MONO

A

960 85.859 134.664 0.000

COMP

A
B

960 88.533 127.372 16.667
960 93.090 145.950 0.000

Table 2 Signal Costs (individual observations).

Individual average costs appear to be similar between the two treatment conditions.
However, in COMP the average total costs per group are 181.623, more than twice those
in MONO.

5.2

Decision-Makers

Figure 2 provides a representation of the correct and wrong choices of the decision-maker.
The left panel (a) refers to the monopoly treatment and shows DM’s guesses conditional
on Sender1 ’s report and the drawn value. The right panel (b) represents DM’s choices in
competition conditional on reports of the two senders.

(a) MONO

(b) COMP

Figure 2 Decision-makers accuracy by treatment. Note: The figure shows DM accuracy in
MONO (a) and COMP (b). The y-axis reports the unconditional frequency of Sender1 reports.
The x-axis shows the unconditional frequency of drawn values (a) and Sender2 reports (b).
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In MONO, the overall frequency of correct guesses is 72.2%. As expected, the decisionmaker is less likely to make a correct guess when Sender1 misreports the state at their
advantage (29.3%). Instead, when a positive number is drawn and the monopolist reports
a positive value, the percentage of correct guesses increases up to 83.2%. In COMP, the
overall frequency of correct choices is 74.0%, very similar to the MONO. However, this
percentage depends on the signs of the reported values. When reports have different
signs, the decision-maker makes the correct choice about half the time (48.9%). Instead,
DM’s accuracy increases when the two reports have the same sign (95.4%). This evidence
suggests that reports are an essential determinant of choices, as decision-makers try to
cross-validate the reports.
The results presented above show that the introduction of competition directly
translates into a wasteful use of resources, as the decision-makers do not benefit, on
average, from an additional information source.

5.3

Welfare

The misreporting costs and DMs’ choices directly translate into participants’ payoffs. We
take the net payoffs of participants as a direct measure of their welfare and as our primary
unit of analysis. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of net payoffs by treatment at the
individual and group levels.
Treatment

Role

N

Mean

SD

Median

MONO

Sender1
Sender2
DM
Group

960
960
960
960

778.307
735.833
488.750
2002.891

386.615
395.026
179.323
263.205

900.000
400.000
600.000
2191.667

COMP

Sender1
Sender2
DM
Group

960
960
960
960

738.967
679.410
495.833
1914.210

404.176
397.577
175.636
310.067

862.500
400.000
600.000
2033.333

Table 3 Net Payoffs (individual observations).

The table shows individual net payoffs are generally higher in MONO than in COMP
for both senders: +5.3% for Sender1 and +8.3% for Sender2 . In contrast, for DMs the
average payoff is lower in the monopolistic than in competitive treatment (−1.4%). On
average, total payoffs in a group are 4.6% higher in MONO than in COMP.
The regression output of Table 4 provides us with a statistical analysis of the descriptive
results reported above. Each column represents a linear mixed-effect model relating the
individual net payoff earned in a round with treatment and individual variables. The table
14
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provides an estimate for each type of player separately and for pooled data (Group).21
The individual net payoff is regressed against a set of main explanatory variables: COMP
is a dummy for the main treatment variable (COMP =1, MONO=0), Drawn represents
the drawn value observed by senders, and Round is the progressive round number. For
senders, we control for the drawn value, as we are interested in the impact of the randomly
drawn number on senders’ payoffs. Because the coefficient of Drawn has no clear meaning
for either DMs nor groups, we focus on the impact of extreme drawn values instead. Hence,
we report the estimated effect of the absolute value of Drawn (|Drawn|). The table also
controls for individual characteristics and attitudes elicited in the final questionnaire.22
Net payoff
COMP
Drawn
COMP ×Drawn
|Drawn|
COMP ×|Drawn|
Round
Male (=1)
Age
Risk
Trust
Honesty
Constant

Sender1
(22.831)∗

−58.166
10.456 (0.518)∗∗∗
1.432 (0.734)

Sender2
(18.838)∗

−42.114
−8.765 (0.544)∗∗∗
−3.200 (0.760)∗∗∗

DM

Group

−25.561 (16.365)

−59.807 (24.510)∗

1.118 (0.525)∗
1.790 (0.739)∗
0.481 (0.515)
−7.964 (20.593)
0.016 (3.580)
0.663 (5.270)
−10.068 (11.359)
−6.314 (17.994)
661.643 (87.167)∗∗∗
5700
190

−0.017 (0.849)
−2.442 (22.002)
1.375 (4.534)
−4.285 (5.509)
−8.975 (12.549)
28.465 (18.762)
747.561 (103.270)∗∗∗

−0.375 (0.887)
−2.335 (16.808)
6.762 (3.230)∗
8.078 (4.696)
4.423 (10.901)
−10.934 (16.220)
554.838 (74.679)∗∗∗

2.589 (0.452)∗∗∗
2.090 (0.636)∗∗
1.384 (0.444)∗∗
−12.974 (12.597)
0.005 (3.148)
0.742 (3.183)
−4.570 (5.906)
−6.104 (11.790)
432.068 (50.382)∗∗∗

1890
63

1890
63

1920
64

Observations
Subjects

Table 4 Net Payoffs.
Note: Linear mixed-effects model with net payoff as a dependent variable. The models include
random intercepts at session and subject level. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels: ∗∗∗ p < 0.001; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗ p < 0.05

The regression outputs for both senders show that competition significantly and
negatively impacts their net payoffs. As expected, larger drawn values have a positive
(negative) effect for Sender1 (Sender2 ). Hence, as a spectator, Sender2 benefits from
a negative drawn value. This effect is more pronounced in the competitive treatment.
For DM, competition does not significantly impact net payoffs. Larger drawn values,
in absolute terms, have a positive impact on the net payoff and the effect is stronger
in competition. The estimated coefficient of Round suggests that the performances of
DMs improve over time. Finally, when considering all type of players together (Group),
competition has a negative impact on welfare. Larger drawn values, in absolute terms,
21

As a robustness check, we also run a regression on the sum of net payoffs at the group level, which
implies dropping individual controls. Results from this check further corroborate those reported in Table
3.
22
The observations of one participant are missing from the regression for Sender1 because they did
not answer the questionnaire. The observations of one participant are missing from the regression for
Sender2 because they identified neither as a male nor as a female. However, results reported in Table 4
are confirmed when including all observations and omitting controls for individual characteristics.
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improve welfare, and this effect is stronger under competition. The outcomes of the table
echo the results discussed previously: introducing a sender with an opposed bias decreases
the total welfare.

5.4
5.4.1

Additional results
Benchmark

In Section 4 we derive some theoretical predictions about expected net payoffs in alternative
equilibria of the game. Although in our preregistration we only mention comparison with
the full information benchmark, we also compare data with the other theoretical predictions.
Table 5 shows the percentage deviations from the no information (No Info) and the full
information (Full Info) benchmarks. Moreover, we also compare net payoffs with the games’
least informative equilibrium (Least Info), as calculated in Section 4. For the monopolistic
condition, the least informative equilibrium is the equilibrium with the least transmission
of information among all the perfect Bayesian equilibria satisfying the Intuitive Criterion.
By contrast, we analyze only two equilibria in the competitive condition, of which only
one is fully revealing. In this case, the least informative equilibrium is the non-revealing
one, which we dubbed “adversarial equilibrium” in Section 4.23

Benchmark
No Info
Full Info
Least Info

MONO
Senders
DM

COMP
Senders
DM

−5.4∗∗∗
−5.4∗∗∗

−11.4∗∗∗
−11.4∗∗∗

22.2∗∗∗
−18.5∗∗∗
−3.3

24.0∗∗∗
−17.3∗∗∗
−4.3∗∗

Table 5 Percentage deviations of net payoffs from
theoretical benchmarks.
Note: The symbols refer to the significance level of a Wilcoxon
Signed Rank test on individual averages. Significance levels:
∗∗∗
p < 0.001; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗ p < 0.05

As shown in the table, senders are generally worse-off than in the no information and
full information benchmarks, as in both cases persuasion would not occur. This result
holds for both treatment conditions. The decision-maker is better off than in the No
Info benchmark but worse off than in the Full Info benchmark. This testifies to partial
information transmission in the experiment. In COMP, the decision-maker obtains a lower
payoff than in the non-revealing adversarial equilibrium. In MONO, the decision-maker
obtains a payoff that is not significantly different from the one predicted by the least
23

The test is performed against a lower bound estimation of the decision-maker’s theoretical payoff in
this non-revealing equilibrium.
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informative equilibrium. Hence, there is evidence of under-communication, that is, that
subjects communicate less than theory predicts in the most informative equilibrium.
5.4.2

Decision times

The time subjects spend making a decision might help us understand whether subjects
react to the different strategic incentives of our treatments. In what follows, we present
an exploratory analysis (not preregistered) of decision times for both senders and decisionmakers. We take the individual average time to make a decision as a proxy for the degree
of deliberation of choice. All times are measured in seconds. To send a report, senders take,
on average, 20.3 and 20.5 seconds in COMP and MONO, respectively. The two averages
are similar and not significantly different (WRT on individual averages, p = 0.570). Overall,
misreporting requires significantly more time than telling the truth, 26.2 and 17.9 seconds,
respectively (Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (WST) on individual averages, p < 0.001). The
same pattern also emerges when considering treatments separately. Hence, misreporting
requires a longer time to deliberate, but no effect of the treatment variation on decision
times is found for senders.
Decision-makers require slightly more time to choose in COMP (13.4) than in MONO
(11.6). However, this difference is not statistically significant (WRT on individual averages,
p = 0.344). Despite average times do not seem to differ between treatments, in COMP
decision times depends on whether reports have the same sign. The time taken to choose
when the two reports have different signs is about 60% more than when they are aligned
(16.5 and 10.8, respectively; WST on individual averages, p < 0.001).
5.4.3

Spectator beliefs

In the monopolistic treatment, Sender2 is not allowed to communicate. Instead, the
spectator is asked to answer two belief elicitation questions using an incentive-compatible
mechanism.24 First, we ask the spectator how likely is Sender1 to report truthfully given
the realized drawn number. The average belief of a truthful report is equal to 67.3% for
positive and 49.7% for negative drawn values. Hence, Sender2 correctly anticipates that
the likelihood of misreporting is higher for drawn values that conflict with the monopolist
interest (WST on individual averages, p < 0.001). However, the spectator seems to fail to
predict the behavior of the monopolist with whom they are matched. The average belief
when the matched sender tells the truth is higher (60.9%) than when the matched player
lies (55.2%). However, this difference is not statistically significant (WST, p = 0.304),
and the central tendency of both sets of beliefs is close to the 50% value, suggesting
indecisiveness.
24

Beliefs are collected over five equally-spaced probability intervals. Here, we compute average beliefs
by taking the median value of each interval as a reference.
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The second question asks how likely it is that the decision-maker chooses Black given
the number reported by Sender1 . Data show that firmer beliefs that the decision-maker will
choose Black are more associated with a positive than a negative report, 69.0%, and 31.5%,
respectively (WST on individual averages, p < 0.001). Hence, the spectator correctly
anticipates that DM will base their choice mainly on the observed reports. Regarding
correctness relative to actual behavior, higher beliefs are observed when DM chooses Black
compared to when they choose Red, 69.6% and 41.1%, respectively. The marked difference
between the two sets of beliefs is statistically significant (WST, p < 0.001) and shows that
observers maintain an overall correct representation of DM’s choices.

6

Conclusion

We use a controlled experiment to study the welfare effects of competition between senders
in a strategic communication environment. In contrast with related work, we introduce an
exogenous cost that senders incur when misreporting information. This cost is increasing
in the size of the lie. Hence, our setup combines elements of standard communication
games with those of all-pay contests. Typically, competition benefits decision-makers in
the former, whereas it may harm contestants in the latter. This tension plays a central
role in several applications, ranging from organizational design to judicial decision-making.
In our experiment, there are two senders with opposed interests and one uninformed
decision-maker. Senders are perfectly and equally informed; hence, there is no scope
for information aggregation. We implement two experimental conditions by varying the
number of senders allowed to communicate. In the first, only one sender communicates
with the decision-maker. In the second, both senders privately communicate with the
decision-maker.
We find that decision-makers do not make more informed decisions when they consult
two senders instead of one. This result does not originate from over-communication in the
monopolistic treatment, as previously observed in related work. Information transmission
is coherent with what theory predicts in the least informative equilibrium. Competition
makes both senders worse off compared to the monopolistic treatment and the benchmark
case where players do not communicate. Overall, competition between senders decreases
the total welfare. The whole economy benefits in cases where the cost of influencing the
decision-maker is higher, as less resources are wasted in misreporting.
Our results have implications for settings with common information and limited
scope for information aggregation. The findings suggest that improvements in decisionmaking may not justify the detrimental effects of competition. In our environment, the
dissipation of resources caused by competitive pressures is not compensated by concurrent
informational gains. Overall, our findings partially support and validate Tullock’s criticism
of adversarial communication systems.
18
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A

Experimental Instructions

In this section we report the on-screen experimental instructions shown to participants.
We use different colours (COMP, MONO) to highlight differences among treatments.

General Information
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. These instructions are
identical for all participants. From now on, communication with other participants is
not allowed. If you do not conform to these rules, we will have to exclude you from the
experiment.

The Experiment This experiment studies decision making between three individuals.
You will participate in 30 rounds of decision making. Please read all the instructions
carefully; the payment that you will receive at the end of the experiment will depend on
your decisions and those of other participants. At the end of the experiment, you will be
asked to fill in a short questionnaire.
Your earnings For your participation you will receive a 4 EURO participation fee. Additional earnings that you can realize during the experiment will be expressed in terms of
points with the following conversion rate: 100 points = 1 EURO.
At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly select two rounds of play. Your
additional earnings from the experiment will be determined by the average of the points
you earned in the two selected rounds. Because during the experiment you might incur
losses, your payment can be negative. If this is the case, then we will deduct your negative
profits from the participation fee. If the fee is not enough to cover your losses, then at
end of the experiment you will be asked to complete an additional task whose duration is
proportional to your losses.
Participation Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. Choosing not to
take part will not disadvantage you in any way. You can withdraw from the experiment at
any time without consequences.
Confidentiality All your answers will be treated confidentially and only used for research
purposes only. Experimental data will be anonymized to ensure that no personal information can be linked to your answers. The data will be deposited in a completely confidential
manner so that it can be used for future research and learning.

2
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Should you have any questions, please contact the experimenter that will answer to your
questions.
Please DO NOT click the NEXT button to read the rest of the instructions until you are
told otherwise.

3
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Role assignment
In each round you will be randomly and anonymously matched in groups of three participants.
The three group members will be referred to as Player A, B, and C. Each of you will be
assigned to one of these three roles only. Thus, your role will remain fixed throughout the
experiment.
Participants will be randomly rematched after each round to form new groups, for a total
of 30 rounds. Each round is a separate decision task.

Decision
In each round, an integer number will be randomly selected from the interval [−100, 100].
We will refer to this number as the Drawn V alue. The following figure (Figure 1) illustrates
an example of how often each number is selected. You can see that the frequency with
which a number is selected increases as one approaches the top of the bell curve. Thus, it
is much more likely that the Drawn V alue is closer to zero than further away from it.

Figure 1: Frequency of draws for the random number Drawn V alue.

The Drawn V alue determines the state of the world. If this number is smaller
than zero, we will say the state is RED and, if it is greater than zero, BLACK. If
Drawn V alue = 0, then the state is either RED or BLACK with equal probability.
Hence, state RED and state BLACK are equally likely to occur.
COMP : The Drawn V alue will be observed only by Players A and B, which in turn will
have to privately report a number to Player C. Player C, after observing the reports
delivered by the other two players (but without observing the Drawn V alue), has to guess
the state by selecting either action Red or Black.

4
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MONO: The Drawn V alue will be observed only by Players A and B. Player A will have
to privately report a number to Player C while Player B will be a spectator. Hence, Player
B does not send any report. However, Player B will be asked her/his beliefs about the
actions of the other players. Details about the expression of beliefs will be provided on
screen to Player B. These beliefs will not be known to either Player A or C, and will
have no consequences on their earnings. Player C, after observing the report delivered
by Player A (but without observing the Drawn V alue), will have to guess the state by
selecting either action Red or Black.
Players A and B’s decisions (Players A’s Decision)
You will be presented with three lines on your screen (Figure 2). All lines range from -100

Figure 2: Example of decision screen for Player B. (In MONO we used a decision screen
from Player A.)

to 100. The first line will be the line corresponding to your role. The lines corresponding
to Players A and B (The line corresponding to Player A) will include a yellow circle
representing the Drawn V alue.
You will be asked to privately report to player C a number of your choice by clicking
on the line corresponding to your role. You can click on the line as many times as you
5
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want until you reach the number you wish to report. Remember, you are free to choose
any number between [−100, 100]. Once your choice is made, click the button “Send” on
your screen.

Player C’s decision
You will be presented with the same three lines on your screen. After seeing Player A’s
and Player B’s reports represented by a circle on their respective lines, you will be asked
to make your decision by choosing either Red or Black.

Your payoff
Each group member can obtain either a higher or a lower payoff that is determined by
the choice made by Player C. You can see this in the previous figure. The colour of the
segments illustrate for what Drawn V alues each player obtains a higher payoff if the
action of the same colour is chosen. To sum up:
• Player A always receives a higher payoff if Black is chosen.
• Player B always receives a higher payoff if Red is chosen.
• Player C receives a higher payoff if he/she chooses:
– Red when the state is RED (Drawn V alue <= 0),
– Black when the state is BLACK (Drawn V alue >= 0).
COMP :
Players A and B’s payoffs
Player A receives 1200 points if Player C chooses action Black, 400 otherwise.
Player B receives 1200 points if Player C chooses action Red, 400 otherwise.
Moreover, there is a cost for sending your report: cost = 25
· |Drawn V alue − report|.
3
This cost increases with the distance between the Drawn V alue, and the number you
report. For your convenience, this cost will be automatically calculated and your expected
earnings will be displayed on your screen while you are making your choice.
In summary,
(
1200 − cost
Payoff (Player A) =
400 − cost
(
1200 − cost
Payoff (Player B) =
400 − cost

if Player C chooses Black
otherwise.
if Player C chooses Red
otherwise.

6
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MONO:
Players A’s payoff
Player A receives 1200 points if Player C chooses action Black, 400 otherwise.
· |Drawn V alue − report|.
Moreover, there is a cost for sending your report: cost = 25
3
This cost increases with the distance between the Drawn V alue, and the number you
report. For your convenience, this cost will be automatically calculated and your expected
earnings will be displayed on your screen while you are making your choice.
In summary,
(
1200 − cost
Payoff (Player A) =
400 − cost

if Player C chooses Black
otherwise.

MONO:
Players B’s payoff
Player B receives 1200 points if Player C chooses action Red, 400 otherwise.
Because Player B does not send any report, his/her payoff only depends from the action
chosen by Player C.
(
1200
if Player C chooses Red
Payoff (Player B) =
400
otherwise.

All treatments:
Player C’s payoff
The amount of points you earn in a round depends on whether the colour of your choice
matches with that of the state.


if choice is Red and state is RED (Drawn V alue < 0)
600
Payoff per round = 600
if choice is Black and state is BLACK (Drawn V alue > 0)


200
otherwise
Remember, when the Drawn V alue equals zero, the state is equally likely to be RED or
BLACK.

Summary information
COMP :
At the end of each round, you will be provided with a summary of the round: what the
7
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Drawn V alue was, Player A’s and Player B’s reports, Player C’s choice, and the points
earned by each member of the group.
MONO:
At the end of each round, you will be provided with a summary of the round: what the
Drawn V alue was, Player A’s report, Player C’s choice, and the points earned by each
member of the group.

Payment
At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly select two rounds out of 30 to
calculate your cash payment. Thus, it is in your best interest to take each round seriously.
You will receive the average of the points that you earned in the two selected rounds. Your
total payment will then be this average, converted in EURO, plus a 4 EURO participation
fee. Note that during the experiment you might incur losses. Thus, your payment from
the two selected rounds might be negative. If that happens, then your negative payment
will be deducted from your participation fee. If this amount of money is not enough to
cover your losses, then you will be asked to complete an additional task whose duration is
proportional to your losses.

Instructions for Spectator (MONO)
Question 1 : The panel above provides you with a description of Value Drawn and of
the incentives of Player A and Player C: Player C earns more when he/she chooses Red
and the Drawn Value is negative or when he/she chooses Black and the Drawn Value is
positive; Player A earns more if Black is chosen.
In the panel below, you are asked to state your beliefs about the probability that Player
A is going to report the value truthfully.
The table also reports the points you earn for each probability and the actual choice of A.
As an example, if you estimate that the probability that the report is truthful is between
0% and 20%, you earn 50 points if the actual report is truthful and 250 otherwise. If you
estimate that the probability that the report is truthful is between 81% and 100%, you
earn 250 points if the actual report is truthful and 50 otherwise.
At the end of the experiment, one of the 30 beliefs about A will be randomly selected and
paid to you.
Probability that Player A reports truthfully?
Question 2 : The panel above provides you with a description of Value Drawn and of
the incentives of Player A and Player C: Player C earns more when he/she chooses Red
8
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Points if the report is truthful
Point if the report is not truthful

0%-20%
50
250

21%-40%
100
200

41%-60%
150
150

61%-80%
200
100

81%-100%
250
50

and the Drawn Value is negative or when he/she chooses Black and the Drawn Value is
positive; Player A earns more if Black is chosen.
In the panel below, you are asked to state your beliefs about the probability that Player
C is going to choose Black.
The table also reports the points you earn for each probability and the actual choice of
C. As an example, if you estimate that the probability that Player C chooses Black is
between 0% and 20%, you earn 50 points if the actual choice is Black and 250 otherwise.
If you estimate that the probability that that Player C chooses Black is between 81% and
100%, you earn 250 points if the actual choice is Black and 50 otherwise.
At the end of the experiment, one of the 30 beliefs about C will be randomly selected and
paid to you.
Probability that Player C chooses Black?

Points if Red is chosen
Points if Black is chosen

0%-20%
50
250

21%-40%
100
200

41%-60%
150
150

61%-80%
200
100

81%-100%
250
50

9
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Final Questionnaire
1. What is your gender?
2. What is your age?
3. What is your nationality?
4. What is your field of study?
5. Do you consider yourself a person who is completely ready to take risks or try
to avoid taking risks? Mark one of the numbers below, where the value 0 means
“absolutely not willing to take risks” and value 10 means “completely willing to take
risks.”
6. In general, do you think most people can be trusted?
• No, you always have to be careful
• No, you have to be careful in most cases
• Yes, you can trust in most cases
• Yes, you can always trust them
7. In general, do you think most people try to take advantage of others if they have
the opportunity?
• No, they always behave correctly
• No, they behave correctly in most cases
• Yes, they try to take advantage of it in most cases
• Yes, they always try to take advantage of it
8. Do you have any comment about the experiment?

Bankruptcy Task
Please insert here your loss:
As an example, if your loss is 3 Euro and 20 cents write “3.20”.
To clear your loss, you must count the number of zeroes in a series of tables similar to the
following.
Given your loss, you must count “X” tables (one table every 0.5 Euro).
In this specific example, the number of zeroes is equal to 37.
10
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B

Tables

VARIABLES
COMP
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(1)
Age

(2)
Gender

(3)
Risk

(4)
Trust

(5)
Honesty

1.783***
(0.421)
21.42***
(0.297)

-0.00526
(0.0742)
1.500***
(0.0524)

-0.327
(0.282)
5.938***
(0.199)

0.0834
(0.0865)
3.927***
(0.0610)

0.0123
(0.0851)
3.167***
(0.0600)

191
0.087

191
0.000

191
0.007

191
0.005

191
0.000

Table B.1 Balancing checks.
Note: One subject in COMP did not complete the final questionnaire.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Subjects
Sessions

MONO

COMP

96
4

96
3

Table B.2 Number of
participants by treatment.

11

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1395

34

Albertazzi et al.: Welfare in Experimental News Markets

MONO

COMP

21.42
(3.10)
5.93
(1.81)

23.2
(2.70)
5.61
(2.08)

Gender :
Female
Male
Non-Binary

47.92
51.04
1.04

49.47
50.53
0

Trust:
No, you always have to be careful
No, you have to be careful in most cases
Yes, you can trust in most cases
Yes, you can always trust them

13.54
66.67
18.75
1.04

17.89
65.26
16.84
0.00

Honesty:
No, they always behave correctly
No, they behave correctly in most cases
Yes, they try to take advantage of it in most cases
Yes, they always try to take advantage of it

0.00
27.08
62.50
10.42

0.00
27.37
63.16
9.47

Observations

96

95

Mean (SD)
Age
Risk
%

Table B.3 Questionnaire variables.
Note: One subject in COMP did not complete the final questionnaire.
Standard deviations in parenthesis.

12
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C

Equilibrium Analysis (not for publication)

C.1

The Monopolistic Communication Game

The proofs and the game studied in this Appendix are, with some minor modificatons,
adapted from Vaccari (2021b).
There are two players: a sender (S) and a receiver (R). The sender privately observes
the realization of a state θ ∈ Θ ⊆ R, and then delivers a news report r ∈ Θ. The receiver
has to choose an action a ∈ {P, N }. Before taking an action, the receiver observes the
sender’s report r but not the state θ.
Denote player j’s “threshold” with τj ∈ R. The utility uj (a, θ) of player j ∈ {S, R} is
non-decreasing in θ and such that uj (P, θ) > uj (N, θ) for all θ > τj and uj (P, θ) < uj (N, θ)
for all θ < τj . We assume that τS < τR and that the utilities uj (·) are continuous for all θ
greater and lower than τj , j ∈ {P, N }. This specification allows uj to have a discontinuity
at τj and be, e.g., a step utility function. In addition, the sender incurs misreporting costs
kC(r, θ), where k is a strictly positive and finite scalar. Denote the sender’s total utility as
vS (r, a, θ) = uS (a, θ) − kC(r, θ). The misreporting cost function C(r, θ) is continuous on
Θ2 with C(r, θ) ≥ 0 for all r ∈ Θ and θ ∈ Θ, C(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Θ. The cost function
C(·) satisfies C(r, θ) > C(r′ , θ) if |r − θ| > |r′ − θ| for all θ ∈ Θ, and C(r, θ) > C(r, θ′ ) if
|r − θ| > |r − θ′ | for all r ∈ Θ.
We assume that the set Θ is convex and that the state θ is randomly drawn from a
common knowledge distribution f , which has full support in Θ, a continuous pdf, and is
symmetric around τR . Given the sender’s utility and misreporting costs, we define the
functions l(r) and r̄S (θ) as follows: for a r > τS ,
l(r) = max {τS , min {θ ∈ Θ|kC(r, θ) = uS (P, θ) − uS (N, θ)}} ,
while for a θ > τS ,
r̄S (θ) = max{r ∈ Θ|kC(r, θ) = uS (P, θ) − uS (N, θ)}.
We further assume that the state space is large enough, that is, Θ ⊇ [l(τR ), r̄S (τR )].
A reporting strategy for the sender is a function ρ : Θ → Θ that associates a report
r ∈ Θ to every state θ ∈ Θ. We say that a report r is off-path if, given strategy ρ(·), r
will not be observed by the voter. Otherwise, we say that r is on-path. A belief function
for the receiver is a mapping p : Θ → ∆(Θ) that, given any news report r ∈ Θ, generates
posterior beliefs p(θ|r), where p(·) is a probability density function. Given a report r
and posterior beliefs p(θ|r), the receiver takes an action in the sequentially rational set
β(r) = arg maxa∈{P,N } Ep [uS (a, θ) | r].
We use the term “generic equilibrium” to denote a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of

13
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this communication game Γ̂ that is robust to the Intuitive Criterion (Cho & Kreps, 1987).
A “sender-preferred equilibrium” of the communication game Γ̂ is the generic equilibrium
preferred by the sender.
Proposition C.1 builds on Lemmata C.1 to C.5 and shows all the generic equilibria of
Γ̂. A sufficient condition on the state space for the existence of all generic equilibria in
Proposition C.1 is Θ ⊇ [τs , r̄s (τR )]. We assume that such a condition is always satisfied.
The set of all the receiver’s pure strategy best responses to a report r and posterior
R
beliefs p(·|r) such that θ∈T p(θ|r)dθ = 1 is defined as1
Z
[
B(T, r) =
arg max
p(θ|r)uR (a, θ)dθ.
p:

R
T

p(θ|r)dθ=1

a∈{P,N }

θ∈Θ

Fix an equilibrium outcome and let vS∗ (θ) denote the sender’s expected equilibrium payoff
in state θ. The set of states for which delivering report r is not equilibrium-dominated for
the sender is


J(r) =

θ ∈ Θ vS∗ (θ) ≤ max vS (r, a, θ) .
a∈B(Θ,r)

An equilibrium does not survive the Intuitive Criterion refinement if there exists a state
θ′ ∈ Θ such that, for some report r′ , vs∗ (θ′ ) < mina∈B(J(r′ ),r′ ) vS (r′ , a, θ′ ).
In Lemma C.5, we use the following notation to denote the limits of the reporting
rule ρ(·) as θ approaches state t from, respectively, above and below: ρ+ (t) = limθ→t+ ρ(θ)
and ρ− (t) = limθ→t− ρ(θ).
Lemma C.1. In a generic equilibrium of Γ̂, ρ(θ) is non-decreasing in θ < τS and θ > τS .
Proof. Consider a generic equilibrium and suppose that there are two states θ′′ > θ′ > τS
such that ρ(θ′ ) > ρ(θ′′ ). We can rule out that β(ρ(θ′ )) = β(ρ(θ′′ )) = N , as in such case the
equilibrium would prescribe ρ(θ′ ) = θ′ < θ′′ = ρ(θ′′ ). If β(ρ(θ′ )) = β(ρ(θ′′ )) = P , then in at
least one of the two states θ′ , θ′′ the sender could profitably deviate by delivering the report
prescribed in the other state. Consider the case where β(ρ(θ′ )) = P (N ) and β(ρ(θ′′ )) = N
(P ). In equilibrium, it has to be that ρ(θ′′ ) = θ′′ (ρ(θ′ ) = θ′ ). Given ρ(θ′ ) > ρ(θ′′ ) = θ′′ > θ′
(θ′′ > θ′ = ρ(θ′ ) > ρ(θ′′ )) and C(ρ(θ′ ), θ′′ ) < C(ρ(θ′ ), θ′ ) (C(ρ(θ′′ ), θ′′ ) > C(ρ(θ′′ ), θ′ )), the
sender could profitably deviate in state θ′′ (θ′ ) by reporting ρ(θ′ ) (ρ(θ′′ )). A similar
argument applies for any two states θ′ < θ′′ < τS , completing the proof.
Lemma C.2. In a generic equilibrium of Γ̂, if ρ(θ) is strictly monotonic and continuous
in an open interval, then ρ(θ) = θ for all θ in such an interval.
Proof. Consider a generic equilibrium and suppose that the reporting rule ρ(·) is strictly
increasing (decreasing) and continuous in an open interval (a, b), but ρ(θ) > θ for some
θ ∈ (a, b). There always exist an ϵ > 0 such that the sender prefers the same alternative
1

For T = ∅, we set B(∅, r) = B(Θ, r).
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in both states θ and θ − ϵ, and θ < ρ(θ − ϵ) < ρ(θ) (resp. ρ(θ − ϵ) > ρ(θ) > θ).
The sender never pays misreporting costs to implement its least preferred alternative;
therefore, it must be that β(ρ(θ)) = β(ρ(θ − ϵ)). Since C(ρ(θ − ϵ), θ) < C(ρ(θ), θ) (resp.
C(ρ(θ), θ − ϵ) < C(ρ(θ − ϵ), θ − ϵ)), the sender has a profitable deviation in state θ (resp.
θ − ϵ), contradicting that ρ(·) is in equilibrium.
Lemma C.3. In a generic equilibrium of Γ̂, ρ(θ) = θ for almost every θ ≤ τS .
Proof. Consider a generic equilibrium and suppose that ρ(θ) ̸= θ for all θ ∈ Θ̂, where Θ̂ is
an open set such that sup Θ̂ ≤ τS and Θ̂ ⊂ Θ. Beliefs must be such that β(r) = P for all
r ∈ Θ̂. Suppose that a report r′ ∈ Θ̂ is off-path. It must be that vS∗ (θ) ≥ vS (r′ , P, θ) for all
θ ≥ τS . Since sup J(r′ ) ≤ τS < τR and B(J(r′ ), r′ ) = N , the sender can profitably deviate
by reporting truthfully when θ = r′ ∈ Θ̂. Hence, all reports r ∈ Θ̂ must be on-path. To
have β(r′ ) = P for a r′ ∈ Θ̂, it must be that ρ(θ′ ) = r′ for some θ′ ≥ τR . In all states
θ > τS such that ρ(θ) ∈ Θ̂, the sender must deliver the same least expensive report r′ ∈ Θ̂
such that β(r′ ) = P . Thus, Θ̂ has measure zero and ρ(θ) = θ for almost every θ ≤ τS .
Lemma C.4. In a generic equilibrium of Γ̂, ρ(·) is discontinuous at some θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that there is a generic equilibrium where ρ(θ) is
continuous in Θ. From Lemma C.3, we know that ρ(θ) = θ for θ ≤ τS . If ρ(θ) = θ also
for all θ > τS , then the equilibrium would be fully revealing. In such case, the sender
could profitably deviate by reporting τR when the state is θ ∈ (τR − ϵ, τR ) for some ϵ > 0.
Therefore, it must be that ρ(θ′ ) ̸= θ′ for some state θ′ > τS . By Lemma C.2, it has to
be that ρ(θ′ ) < θ′ , or otherwise ρ(·) would be discontinuous; therefore Lemmata C.1 and
C.2 imply that ρ(θ) = ρ(θ′ ) for all θ ∈ (max{ρ(θ′ ), τS }, sup Θ). There always exists a
report r′ ≥ θ′ such that inf J(r′ ) ≥ max{ρ(θ′ ), τS }. Since β(ρ(θ′ )) = P , it must be that
B(J(r′ ), r′ ) = P . Therefore, there are states where the sender would have a profitable
deviation, contradicting that a continuous ρ(·) can be part of a generic equilibrium.
Lemma C.5. In a generic equilibrium of Γ̂, ρ(·) has a unique discontinuity in state θδ ,
where θδ ∈ [τS , τR ]. The reporting rule2 is such that ρ(θ) = ρ+ (θδ ) > θδ = l(ρ+ (θδ )) for
θ ∈ (θδ , ρ+ (θδ )) and ρ(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ (inf Θ, θδ ) ∪ [ρ+ (θδ ), sup Θ).
Proof. I denote by θδ the lowest state in which a discontinuity of ρ(·) occurs. By Lemmata C.3 and C.4, we know that in equilibrium such a discontinuity exists and θδ ≥ τS .
Suppose that ρ− (θδ ) ̸= θδ . If ρ− (θδ ) < θδ , then by Lemmata C.1 and C.2 we have
that ρ(θ) = ρ− (θδ ) for all θ ∈ (max{ρ− (θδ ), τS }, θδ ) and ρ(θ) = θ for θ ≤ max{ρ− (θδ ), τS }.
In equilibrium, it has to be that β(ρ− (θδ )) = P and β(r′ ) = N for every off-path
r′ ∈ (max{ρ− (θδ ), τS }, θδ ). Hence, every report r′ ∈ (max{ρ− (θδ ), τS }, θδ ) is equilibrium
dominated for all θ < θ′ , where θ′ = {θ ∈ Θ | C(ρ− (θδ ), θ) = C(r′ , θ)}. Therefore,
2

Recall that ρ+ (t) = limθ→t+ ρ(θ) and ρ− (t) = limθ→t− ρ(θ).
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B(J(r′ ), r′ ) = P , and the sender could profitably deviate by reporting r′ instead of ρ− (θδ )
when θ ∈ (θ′ , θδ ). Suppose now that ρ− (θδ ) > θδ . By Lemma C.1 we have ρ− (τS ) = τS ,
and thus it has to be that θδ > τS . Similarly to the previous case, in equilibrium it must
be that ρ(θ) = ρ− (θδ ) for all θ ∈ (τS , θδ ). This is in contradiction to θδ being the lowest
discontinuity, as we would have ρ+ (τS ) > τS . Therefore, in every generic equilibrium,
ρ− (θδ ) = θδ ≥ τS and ρ(θ) = θ for θ < θδ .
From Lemmata C.1 and C.2, it follows that ρ+ (θδ ) > θδ and ρ(θ) = ρ+ (θδ ) for every
θ ∈ (θδ , ρ+ (θδ )]: since it must be that β(ρ+ (θδ )) = P , the sender would profitably deviate
by reporting ρ+ (θδ ) in every state θ ∈ (θδ , ρ+ (θδ )] such that ρ(θ) > ρ+ (θδ ). To prevent
other profitable deviations, ρ+ (θδ ) must be such that uS (P, θ) − uS (N, θ) ≤ kC(ρ+ (θδ ), θ)
for θ ∈ (τS , θδ ) and uS (P, θ) − uS (N, θ) ≥ kC(ρ+ (θδ ), θ) for all θ ∈ [θδ , ρ+ (θδ )]. Together,
these conditions imply that θδ = l(ρ+ (θδ )). Any off-path report r′ > ρ+ (θδ ) would be
equilibrium-dominated by all θ ≤ ρ+ (θδ ), yielding B(J(r′ ), r′ ) = P . Therefore, it must be
that ρ(θ) = θ for all θ ≥ ρ+ (θδ ), and ρ(θ) = ρ+ (θδ ) for θ ∈ (θδ , ρ+ (θδ )).
Suppose now that θδ > τR . Given the reporting rule, posterior beliefs p must be
degenerate on θ = r for all r ∈ [τR , θδ ). In this case, there always exists an ϵ > 0 such that
the sender can profitably deviate by reporting τR instead of θ in states θ ∈ (τR − ϵ, τR ).
Therefore, θδ ∈ [τS , τR ].
Proposition C.1. A pair (ρ(θ), p(θ | r)) is a generic equilibrium of Γ̂ if and only if, for a
given λ ∈ [τR , Ef [θ|θ ∈ (τR , r̄S (τR ))]],
i) The reporting rule ρ(θ) is, for a λ ∈ [τR , Ef [θ|θ ∈ (τR , r̄S (τR ))]),
(
r̂(λ) = min {{r ∈ Θ|Ef [θ|θ ∈ (l(r), r)] = λ}, 2λ − τS }
ρ(θ) =
θ

if θ ∈ (l (r̂(λ)) , r̂(λ))
otherwise.

When λ = Ef [θ|θ ∈ (τR , r̄S (τR ))], ρ(θ) = r̂(λ) for θ ∈ [l(r̂(λ)), r̂(λ)), and ρ(θ) = θ
otherwise.3
ii) Posterior beliefs p(θ | r) are according to Bayes’ rule whenever possible and such
that Ep [θ |r̂(λ)] = λ, Ep [θ |r] < τR for every off-path r, and p(θ | r) are degenerate on
θ = r otherwise.
Proof. Given the reporting rule ρ(·) described in Lemma C.5, beliefs p must be such
that β(ρ+ (θδ )) = P , and thus Ep [θ | ρ+ (θδ )] = Ef [θ|θ ∈ (θδ , ρ+ (θδ ))] ≥ τR , where θδ =
l(ρ+ (θδ )) ≤ τR and, similarly, ρ+ (θδ ) = r̄S (θδ ) > τR . It follows that the expectation
Ep [θ | ρ+ (θδ )] induced by the report ρ+ (θδ ) has to be between τR and Ef [θ|θ ∈ (τR , r̄S (τR ))].
I define the pooling report r̂(λ) as
r̂(λ) := {r ∈ R | Ef [θ | l(r) < θ < r] = λ} .
3
Up to changes of measure zero in ρ(θ) due to the sender being indifferent between reporting l(r̂(λ))
and r̂(λ) when the state is θ = l(r̂(λ)) > τS .
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For a λ ∈ [τR , Ef [θ|θ ∈ (τR , r̄S (τR ))]), we can rewrite the reporting rule described in
Lemma C.5 as
(
r̂(λ)
if θ ∈ (l (r̂(λ)) , r̂(λ))
ρ(θ) =
(2)
θ
otherwise.
Alternatively, (2) can have ρ(l(r̂(λ)) = r̂(λ) as long as l(r̂(λ)) > τS . If λ = Ef [θ|θ ∈
(τR , r̄S (τR ))], then it must be that (2) has ρ(l(r̂(λ))) = r̂(λ); otherwise the sender would
profitably deviate by reporting τR when the state is θ ∈ (τR −ϵ, τR +ϵ) for some ϵ > 0. Since
θ is symmetrically distributed around τR , we have r̂(λ) = {r ∈ Θ|Ef [θ|θ ∈ (l(r), r)] = λ}
if l(r̂(λ)) > τS and r̂(λ) = 2λ − τS otherwise.
By applying Bayes’ rule to (2), we obtain that posterior beliefs p(θ|r) are such
that Ep [θ | r̂(λ)] = λ ∈ [τR , Ef [θ|θ ∈ (τR , r̄S (τR ))]], and are degenerate on θ = r for all
r ∈
/ [l (r̂ (λ)) , r̂ (λ)). For every off-path report r′ ∈ (l (r̂ (λ)) , r̂ (λ)) it must be that
Ep [θ | r′ ] < τR to have β(r′ ) = N . These off-path beliefs are consistent with the Intuitive
Criterion since for every r′ ∈ (l (r̂ (λ)) , r̂ (λ)) we have that inf J(r′ ) < l(r̂(λ)) ≤ τR ,
and thus N ∈ B(J(r′ ), r′ ). The proof is completed by the observation that the pair
(ρ(θ), p(θ|r)) described in Proposition C.1 is indeed a generic equilibrium of Γ̂ for every
λ ∈ [τR , Ef [θ|θ ∈ (τR , r̄S (τR ))]].

C.2

The Competitive Communication Game

The equilibria of the competitive game with two active senders are studied in Vaccari
(2021a). First, consider the fully revealing equilibrium with two active senders as discussed
in Section 4. On-path beliefs are pinned down by the senders’ reporting strategies,
which are revealing because of Sender2 ’s truthful strategy. The decision-maker’s beliefs
after observing an off-path pair of reports are such that DM selects action Black only if
r1 ≥ r̄1 (0), and selects Red otherwise. Since there are no individual profitable deviations
from the prescribed strategies, this is an equilibrium.
Second, consider the adversarial equilibrium strategies. Denote by Udm (r1 , r2 ) the
decision-maker’s expected differential utility from selecting Black rather than Red in an
adversarial equilibrium given the pair of reports (r1 , r2 ). The decision-maker’s posterior
beliefs satisfy three properties: (i) for every rj ≥ rj′ and j ∈ {1, 2}, we have Udm (r1 , r2 ) ≥
Udm (r1′ , r2′ ); (ii) for every pair of reports (r1 , r2 ) such that r2 ≤ 0 ≤ r1 , and for j ∈ {1, 2},
we have dUdm (r1 , r2 )/drj > 0; (iii) Udm (r̄1 (0), r̄2 (0)) = Udm (0, 0) = 0. Vaccari (2021a)
shows that, given these properties and the players’ symmetric features, posterior beliefs
are such that the decision maker follows the recommendation of the sender delivering the
highest report in absolute value. That is, given r1 ≥ 0 ≥ r2 , the decision maker selects
Black if r1 ≥ |r2 |, and selects Red otherwise. The posterior beliefs are coherent with the
senders’ reporting strategies. Given these beliefs, no sender has an individual profitable
deviation. Therefore, this is an equilibrium.
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